Xinhua News Agency

Xinhua News Agency (English pronunciation: /ˌʃɪnˈhwɑː/)[2], or New China News Agency, is the official state news agency of the People's Republic of China. Xinhua is a ministry-level institution subordinate to the State Council and is the highest ranking state media organ in China.

Xinhua News Agency
Native name
FormerlyRed China News Agency (1931–1937)
TypeState news agency
FoundedNovember 1931 (1931-11), in Ruijin, Jiangxi, Chinese Soviet Republic
FounderChinese Communist Party
Global: Beijing, China
Overseas: 1540 Broadway
Times Square
New York, NY 10036
Area served
Key people
Fu Hua (President and Party Secretary)
Lu Yansong (Editor-in-chef and deputy Party Secretary)
OwnerPeople's Republic of China
(state-owned institution)
ParentState Council of the People's Republic of China
SubsidiariesReference News
China Xinhua News Network Corporation
CNC World
Xinhua News Agency
Simplified Chinese新华通讯社
Traditional Chinese新華通訊社
Literal meaningNew China News Agency
Abbreviated name
Simplified Chinese新华社
Traditional Chinese新華社
Literal meaningNew China Agency
Xinhua headquarters office in Beijing
39°53′57″N 116°21′54″E

Xinhua is a publisher as well as a news agency. Xinhua publishes in multiple languages and is a channel for the distribution of information related to the Chinese government and the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Its headquarters in Beijing are located close to the central government's headquarters at Zhongnanhai.

Xinhua tailors its pro-Chinese government message to the nuances of each audience.[3][4] Xinhua has faced criticism for spreading propaganda and disinformation and for criticizing people, groups, or movements critical of the Chinese government and its policies.[5][6][7]


Building of Red China News Agency in 1937
Xinhua News Agency's overseas flagship digital billboard was inaugurated on Times Square, at the heart of Manhattan, New York City in 2010.

The predecessor to Xinhua was the Red China News Agency (紅色中華通訊社; Hóngsè Zhōnghuá Tōngxùnshè), founded in November 1931 as the Chinese Soviet Zone of Ruijin, Jiangxi province. It mostly republished news from its rival Central News Agency (CNA) for party and army officials. The agency got its name of Xinhua in November 1935, at the end of the Long March, in which the Chinese Red Army retreated from Jiangxi to Shaanxi. By the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937, Xinhua's Reference News translated CNA news from the Kuomintang, and also international news from agencies like TASS and Havas. Xinhua first started using letterpress printing in 1940.[8]

During the Pacific War the agency developed overseas broadcasting capabilities and established its first overseas branches.[9] It began broadcasting to foreign countries in English from 1944. In 1949, Xinhua followed a subscription model instead of its previous limited distribution model.[8] In the direct aftermath of the Chinese Civil War, the agency represented the People's Republic of China in countries and territories with which it had no diplomatic representation, such as British Hong Kong.[9] In 1956, Xinhua began reporting on anti-Marxist and other opinions critical of the CCP. In 1957, Xinhua switched from a journal format to a newspaper format.[8]

The agency was described by media scholars as the "eyes and tongue" of the CCP, observing what is important for the masses and passing on the information.[10] A former Xinhua director, Zheng Tao, noted that the agency was a bridge between the CCP, the government and the people, communicating both the demands of the people and the policies of the Party.[11]

In 2018, the United States Department of Justice directed Xinhua's U.S. branch to register as a foreign agent under the Foreign Agents Registration Act.[12][13][14] In 2020, the United States Department of State designated Xinhua and other state-owned media outlets a foreign mission.[15][16] Xinhua registered in the US as a foreign agent in May 2021.[17]

In June 2022, Fu Hua, the former Chinese Communist Party Committee Secretary of Beijing Daily, was appointed president of Xinhua.[18] In September 2022, Fu stated, "Xinhua will never depart from the party line, not even for a minute, nor stray from the path laid down by general secretary Xi Jinping".[19]


By 2021, Xinhua had 181 bureaus globally, publishing news in multiple languages.[20] Xinhua is also responsible for handling, and in some cases, censoring reports from foreign media destined for release in China.[21] In 2010, Xinhua acquired prime commercial real estate on Times Square in Manhattan and started an English-language satellite news network.[22] Xinhua has paid other media outlets such as The New York Times, The Washington Post, and The Wall Street Journal to carry its inserts, branded as "China Watch" or "China Focus".[23]

Internal media

The CCP's internal media system, in which certain journals are published exclusively for government and party officials, provides information and analysis which are not generally available to the public. The State values these internal reports because they contain much of China's most sensitive, controversial, and high-quality investigative journalism.[24]

Xinhua produces reports for the "internal" journals. Informed observers note that journalists generally like to write for the internal publications because they can write less polemical and more comprehensive stories without making the omissions of unwelcome details commonly made in the media directed to the general public. The internal reports, written from a large number of countries, typically consist of in-depth analyses of international situations and domestic attitudes towards regional issues and perceptions of China.[25]

The Chinese government's internal media publication system follows a strict hierarchical pattern designed to facilitate party control. A publication called Reference News—which includes translated articles from abroad as well as news and commentary by Xinhua reporters—is delivered by Xinhua personnel, rather than by the national mail system, to officials at the working level and above. A three-to-ten-page report called Internal Reference (Neibu Cankao) is distributed to officials at the ministerial level and higher. One example was the first reports on the SARS outbreak by Xinhua which only government officials were allowed to see.[26] The most classified Xinhua internal reports are issued to the top dozen or so party and government officials.[27]

Headquarters and regional offices

Bureau in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

Xinhua headquarters is located in Beijing, strategically located in close proximity to Zhongnanhai, which houses the headquarters of the CCP, the General Secretary, and the State Council. Xinhua established its first overseas affiliate in 1947 in London, with Samuel Chinque as publisher. It distributes its news from the publication's overseas headquarters in New York City, in conjunction with distributing coverage from the United Nations bureau, as well as its other hubs in Asia, Middle East, Latin America, and Africa.[28]

Hong Kong

Xinhua's branch in Hong Kong was not just a press office, but served as the de facto embassy of the PRC in the territory when it was under British administration. It was named a news agency under the special historic conditions before the territory's sovereignty was transferred from Britain to China, because the People's Republic did not recognize British sovereignty over the colony, and could not set up a consulate on what it considered to be its soil.[29]

Despite its unofficial status, the directors of the Xinhua Hong Kong Branch included high-ranking former diplomats such as Zhou Nan, former Ambassador to the United Nations and Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, who later negotiated the Sino-British Joint Declaration on the future of Hong Kong.[30] His predecessor, Xu Jiatun, was also vice-chairman of the Hong Kong Basic Law Drafting Committee, before fleeing to the United States in response to the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre, where he went into exile.[31][32]

It was authorized by the special administrative region government to continue to represent the central government after 1997, and it was renamed "The Liaison Office of the Central People's Government in the Hong Kong SAR" on 18 January 2000, retaining branch chief Jiang Enzhu as inaugural director.[33] The State Council appointed Gao Siren (高祀仁) as the director in August 2002.


Xinhua opened its Middle East Regional Bureau in Cairo, Egypt in 1985.[34]

Cooperation with other media outlets

In 2015, Xinhua and other Chinese state media outlets signed cooperation and content-sharing agreements with Russian state media outlets.[35][36]

In November 2018, Xinhua News Agency and the Associated Press (AP) of the United States signed a memorandum of understanding to expand cooperation. Some lawmakers in the US congress asked the AP to release the text of its memorandum of understanding with Xinhua. In response, AP spokeswoman Lauren Easton told The Washington Post that AP's agreement with Xinhua is to allow it to operate inside China and has no bearing on AP's independence, and that Xinhua has no access to AP's sensitive information and no influence over AP's editorial decisions.[37]

In December 2022, journalist Joshua Kurlantzick said that Xinhua has had more success than other Chinese state media outlets such as China Global Television Network and China Radio International in acting as a part of China's media offensive, with Xinhua having signed content sharing agreements with many news agencies around the world.[20] He noted that "unlike with, say, a television station that a viewer has to actively turn on, and probably knows the channel, most print or online readers do not check the bylines of news articles—making it easier for Xinhua copy to slip through to readers."[20] He also noted: "In developing countries, Xinhua is increasingly stepping into the void left by other news wires like the Associated Press, because Xinhua content is free or cheap", and warned about Xinhua content being used by local news outlets in countries such as Thailand, saying: "Readers don't really notice where it comes from. That's going to skew the views of the general reading public, and that's quite dangerous."[38]


Political bias, censorship, and disinformation

In 2005, Reporters Without Borders called Xinhua "The World's Biggest Propaganda Machine", pointing out that Xinhua's president held the rank of a minister in the government. The report stated that the news agency was "at the heart of censorship and disinformation put in place" by the government.[4][39]

In a 2007 interview with The Times of India, then Xinhua president Tian Congming affirmed the problem of "historical setbacks and popular perceptions" with respect to Xinhua's credibility.[40] Newsweek criticized Xinhua as "being best known for its blind spots" regarding controversial news in China, although the article acknowledges that "Xinhua's spin diminishes when the news doesn't involve China".[41]

During the 2002–2004 SARS outbreak, Xinhua was slow to release reports of the incident to the public. However, its reporting in the aftermath of the 2008 Sichuan earthquake was seen as more transparent and credible as Xinhua journalists operated more freely.[42][43] After the Beijing Television Cultural Center fire, the vice president of the CCP's China International Publishing Group stated that quantity of media exposure would not necessarily help perceptions of China. Rather, he said, media should focus on emphasizing Chinese culture "to convey the message that China is a friend, not an enemy".[44]

Xinhua has criticized perceived foreign media bias and inaccurate reporting, citing an incident during the 2008 Tibetan unrest when media outlets used scenes of Nepalese police arresting Tibetan protesters as evidence of Chinese state brutality[45] with commentary from CNN's Jack Cafferty calling the Chinese "goons and thugs". CNN later apologized for the comments.[46]

1968 industrial espionage allegations

During the May 68 events in France, Xinhua and PRC embassy press office staff were reported to exploit civil unrest to undertake industrial espionage at French factories.[31]

1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre

Xinhua staff struggled to find the "right line" to use in covering the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre. Although more cautious than People's Daily in its treatment of sensitive topics during that period – such as how to commemorate reformist CCP leader Hu Yaobang's April 1989 death and then ongoing demonstrations in Beijing and elsewhere – Xinhua gave some favorable coverage to demonstrators and intellectuals supportive of the movement. Conflict between journalists and top editors over the censorship of stories about the Tiananmen Square crackdown lasted for several days after the military's dispersal of demonstrators on 4 June, with some journalists going on strike and demonstrating inside the agency's Beijing headquarters. Government oversight of the media increased after the protests – top editors at the agency's bureaus in Hong Kong and Macau were replaced with appointees who were pro-Beijing.[47]

2012 Mark Bourrie resignation and espionage allegations

In 2012, Xinhua's Ottawa correspondent Mark Bourrie resigned after Ottawa bureau chief Zhang Dacheng allegedly requested him to report on the Dalai Lama for Xinhua's internal media, which Bourrie felt amounted to gathering intelligence for China.[48][49][50] Zhang denied the allegation, telling the Canadian Press that Xinhua's policy is to "cover public events by public means" and his bureau's job is to cover news events and file the stories to Xinhua's editing rooms, who would then decide which stories would be published.[51] Bourrie, who had a press pass providing him access to the Parliament of Canada, had previously tried to consult the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) in 2009 on the matter of writing for Xinhua, but was ignored by CSIS.[52]

2017 Doklam standoff

During the 2017 China–India border standoff, Xinhua's English-language new media program The Spark released a satirical video named the "Seven Sins of India" on 16 August 2017, in which presenter Di'er Wang spoke of Indians having "thick skin" and "pretending to sleep" on the matter of the border dispute. Wang stated that India was physically threatening Bhutan, and compared India to a "robber who breaks into a house and does not leave". An actor in the video portraying "India" with a turban, beard and accent sparked allegations of racism and anti-Indian sentiment. The video was criticized on Twitter and by Indian and Western media.[53][54][55][56]

2018 Devumi allegations

In January 2018, The New York Times published an investigative report on social media promotions, alleging that the US-based company Devumi was providing "Twitter followers and retweets to celebrities, businesses and anyone who wants to appear more popular or exert influence online." The article alleged an unnamed Xinhua editor bought "hundreds of thousands of followers and retweets on Twitter".[57]

2019 Hong Kong protests

In 2019, Xinhua was criticized for perceived bias in its portrayal of the 2019–20 Hong Kong protests as violent and illegitimate, which led Twitter to ban it and other state-sponsored media outlets from ad purchases.[7][58]

COVID-19 pandemic

In 2020, Xinhua was one of several Chinese state media agencies reported to have been disseminating propaganda, targeted advertisements and social media posts, and news that showed the Chinese government in a better light.[59][6][60][61]

2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine

During the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, Xinhua and other Chinese state media outlets paid for digital ads on Facebook supporting pro-Kremlin disinformation and propaganda, including dissemination of the Ukraine biolabs conspiracy theory, after Meta Platforms banned Russian state media advertisement buys.[62][63][64][65]

2022 Chinese military exercises around Taiwan

During the 2022 Chinese military exercises around Taiwan, Xinhua published an altered image of a Taiwanese Chi Yang-class frigate near the coast of Hualien County appearing to be a People's Liberation Army Navy vessel. The Taiwanese Ministry of National Defense labelled the image as disinformation.[66][67][68]

See also


  1. Troianovski, Anton (30 June 2010). "China Agency Nears Times Square". Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 19 March 2022.
  2. J. C. Wells: Longman Pronunciation Dictionary, 3rd ed., for both British and American English
  3. Brazys, Samuel; Dukalskis, Alexander (October 2020). "China's Message Machine". Journal of Democracy. 31 (4): 59–73. doi:10.1353/jod.2020.0055. S2CID 226761150.
  4. "Xinhua: the world's biggest propaganda agency". Reporters Without Borders. 30 September 2005. Archived from the original on 23 March 2021. Retrieved 15 June 2020.
  5. Dukalskis, Alexander (3 June 2021). Making the World Safe for Dictatorship (1 ed.). Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780197520130.001.0001. ISBN 978-0-19-752013-0.
  6. Molter, Vanessa; DiResta, Renee (8 June 2020). "Pandemics & propaganda: how Chinese state media creates and propagates CCP coronavirus narratives". Harvard Kennedy School Misinformation Review. 1 (3). doi:10.37016/mr-2020-025.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  7. Kan, Michael (19 August 2019). "Twitter Bans State-Sponsored Media Ads Over Hong Kong Propaganda". PC Magazine. Archived from the original on 21 August 2019. Retrieved 21 August 2019.
  8. Xia, Liang (21 January 2019). A Discourse Analysis of News Translation in China (1 ed.). Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2019. |: Routledge. pp. 26–27. doi:10.4324/9781351021463. ISBN 978-1-351-02146-3. S2CID 159335133.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link)
  9. Hoare, Jim; Hoare, James; Pares, Susan (2005). A Political and Economic Dictionary of East Asia. Psychology Press. ISBN 978-1-85743-258-9.
  10. Malek, Abbas; Kavoori, Anandam P. (2000). The Global Dynamics of News: Studies in International News Coverage and News Agenda. Greenwood Publishing Group. p. 346. ISBN 978-1-56750-462-0.
  11. Markham, James Walter (1967). Voices of the Red Giants: Communications in Russia and China. Iowa State University Press. ISBN 978-0-8138-1085-0.
  12. "Justice Department Has Ordered Key Chinese State Media Firms to Register as Foreign Agents". The Wall Street Journal. 18 September 2018. Archived from the original on 18 April 2019. Retrieved 21 September 2018.
  13. Brunnstrom, David (15 November 2017). "U.S. Congress urged to require Chinese journalists to register as agents". Reuters. Archived from the original on 1 September 2018. Retrieved 1 September 2018.
  14. Yik-tung, Ng; Siu-fung, Lau (19 September 2018). "U.S. Orders Chinese State News Outlets to Register as Foreign Agents". Radio Free Asia. Archived from the original on 7 April 2020. Retrieved 6 April 2020.
  15. Tandon, Shaun (8 April 2020). "US tightens rules on Chinese state media". Hong Kong Free Press. Agence France-Presse. Archived from the original on 8 April 2020. Retrieved 9 April 2020.
  16. Lee, Matthew (18 February 2020). "US designates 5 Chinese media outlets as foreign missions". Associated Press. Archived from the original on 7 April 2020. Retrieved 6 April 2020.
  17. Markay, Lachlan (11 May 2021). "China increases spending 500% to influence America". Axios. Archived from the original on 11 May 2021. Retrieved 12 May 2021.
  18. Bandurski, David (8 June 2022). "Xinhua's Innovative Party Man". China Media Project. Retrieved 18 June 2022.
  19. Chen, Mia Ping-chieh (7 September 2022). "China's state media urged not to stray from party line, dumb down ideology". Radio Free Asia. Retrieved 8 September 2022.
  20. Kurlantzick, Joshua (5 December 2022). "China Wants Your Attention, Please". Foreign Policy. Retrieved 1 January 2023.
  21. Charles Glasser. (2009). International Libel and Privacy Handbook: A Global Reference for Journalists, Publishers, Webmasters, and Lawyers. Bloomberg Press. ISBN 978-1-57660-324-6
  22. Troianovski, Anton (30 June 2010). "China Agency Nears Times Square". The Wall Street Journal. Archived from the original on 10 October 2017. Retrieved 8 August 2017.
  23. Dotson, John (12 April 2021). "Xinhua Infiltrates Western Electronic Media, Part One: Online "Advertorial" Content". China Brief. Jamestown Foundation. Archived from the original on 27 June 2021. Retrieved 18 April 2021.
  24. Mattis, Peter (18 August 2015). "A Guide to Chinese Intelligence Operations". War on the Rocks. Archived from the original on 25 December 2020. Retrieved 27 October 2020.
  25. Lampton, David M. (2001). The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978-2000. Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-0-8047-4056-2.
  26. "Chinese whispers". The Economist. 17 June 2010. ISSN 0013-0613. Archived from the original on 17 April 2021. Retrieved 25 February 2022.
  27. 解密中国特色的“内参”:直抵政治局 能量巨大 Archived 28 January 2018 at the Wayback Machine. Sohu.
  28. Hong, Junhao (2011). "From the World's Largest Propaganda Machine to a Multipurposed Global News Agency: Factors in and Implications of Xinhua's Transformation Since 1978". Political Communication. 28 (3): 377–393. doi:10.1080/10584609.2011.572487. S2CID 143208781.
  29. The Long History of United Front Activity in Hong Kong Archived 29 January 2016 at the Wayback Machine, Hong Kong Journal, Cindy Yik-yi Chu, July 2011
  30. 'Poet diplomat' Zhou Nan takes aim at Occupy Central Archived 22 October 2015 at the Wayback Machine, South China Morning Post, 16 June 2014
  31. Faligot, Roger (May 2019). Chinese Spies: From Chairman Mao to Xi Jinping. Oxford University Press. pp. 192, 276. ISBN 978-1-78738-096-7. OCLC 1099591263.
  32. China's ex-proxy in Hong Kong fired for 'betrayal' Archived 10 May 2017 at the Wayback Machine, United Press International, 22 February 1991
  33. "Jiang Enzhu on Renaming Xinhua Hong Kong Branch". People's Daily. Beijing: Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. 17 January 2000. Archived from the original on 10 October 2017. Retrieved 15 May 2017.
  34. New office building of Xinhua Middle East regional bureau opens in Cairo Archived 20 November 2008 at the Wayback Machine 2005/11/26
  35. Davidson, Helen (31 March 2022). "Close ties allow Russian propaganda to spread swiftly through China, report claims". The Guardian. Retrieved 9 April 2022.
  36. Yang, William (6 April 2022). "Ukraine war: How Russian propaganda dominates Chinese social media". Deutsche Welle. Retrieved 9 April 2022.
  37. Rogin, Josh (24 December 2018). "Congress demands answers on AP's relationship with Chinese state media". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on 26 December 2018. Retrieved 27 December 2018.
  38. Scott, Liam (6 December 2022). "How China became a global disinformation superpower". Coda Media. Retrieved 15 December 2022.
  39. "Xinhua, China's news agency and 'propaganda tool'". Hindustan Times. 25 July 2016. Archived from the original on 17 August 2017. Retrieved 17 August 2017.
  40. Q&A: 'Our credibility is doubted to a certain degree' Archived 23 October 2012 at the Wayback Machine, Times of India, 28 September 2007.
  41. Stone Fish, Isaac; Dokoupil, Tony (3 September 2010). "Is China's Xinhua the Future of Journalism?". Newsweek. Archived from the original on 4 September 2010. Retrieved 5 September 2010.
  42. Quake coverage 'testing China's media credibility' Archived 4 June 2009 at the Wayback Machine, Radio Australia, 16 May 2008
  43. McMaster, Nick (14 May 2008). "Quake Moves Xinhua Past Propaganda". Newser. Retrieved 15 January 2023.
  44. China to spend billions to boost media credibility Archived 3 June 2009 at the Wayback Machine, Radio86, 10 March 2009
  45. Commentary: Biased Media Reports Reveal Credibility Crisis Archived 18 October 2012 at the Wayback Machine, Xinhua, 26 March 2008
  46. Barboza, David (16 May 2008). "China: CNN Apologizes Over Tibet Comments". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 23 July 2016. Retrieved 23 February 2017.
  47. Lee, Chin-Chuan; Li, Jinquan (2000). Power, Money, and Media: Communication Patterns and Bureaucratic Control in Cultural China. Northwestern University Press. p. 298. ISBN 978-0-8101-1787-7.
  48. Carlson, Kathryn Blaze (22 August 2012). "China's state-run news agency being used to monitor critics in Canada: reporter". National Post. Archived from the original on 16 February 2013. Retrieved 14 February 2018.
  49. "Reporter says Chinese news agency asked him to spy". Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. The Canadian Press. 22 August 2012. Archived from the original on 23 August 2012. Retrieved 22 August 2012.
  50. Green, Justin (24 August 2012). "Journalist, Or Spy? Xinhua Doesn't Distinguish". The Daily Beast. Archived from the original on 26 January 2021. Retrieved 27 October 2020.
  51. Blanchfield, Mike. "Mark Bourrie: Xinhua, Chinese News Agency, Tried To Get Me To Spy". Huffington Post. Archived from the original on 9 February 2018. Retrieved 14 February 2018.
  52. Bourrie, Mark. "THE EX FILES: Journalist Mark Bourrie's behind-the-scenes account of his two years in the employ of Xinhua". Ottawa Magazine. Archived from the original on 24 September 2015. Retrieved 14 February 2018.
  53. "7 Sins of India: China's bizarre video attack over border dispute". NewsComAu. Archived from the original on 6 September 2017. Retrieved 17 August 2017.
  54. "Chinese media mocks India with racist video on Doklam standoff". Archived from the original on 10 September 2017. Retrieved 17 August 2017.
  55. Linder, Alex (17 August 2017). "WATCH: Xinhua attacks India with racist propaganda video on Doklam border dispute". Shanghaiist. Archived from the original on 20 August 2017. Retrieved 17 August 2017.
  56. Chandran, Nyshka (17 August 2017). "Chinese media Xinhua mocks Indians and PM Narendra Modi's policies in racist video". CNBC. Archived from the original on 17 August 2017. Retrieved 17 August 2017.
  57. Confessore, Nicholas; Dance, Gabriel J. X.; Harris, Rich; Hansen, Mark (27 January 2018). "The Follower Factory". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 25 February 2022.
  58. Lakshmanan, Ravie (19 August 2019). "China is paying Twitter to publish propaganda against Hong Kong protesters". The Next Web. Archived from the original on 20 August 2019. Retrieved 21 August 2019.
  59. Kao, Jeff; Li, Mia Shuang (26 March 2020). "How China Built a Twitter Propaganda Machine Then Let It Loose on Coronavirus". ProPublica. Archived from the original on 30 March 2020. Retrieved 31 March 2020.
  60. Dodds, Laurence (5 April 2020). "China floods Facebook with undeclared coronavirus propaganda ads blaming Trump". The Telegraph. ISSN 0307-1235. Archived from the original on 6 April 2020. Retrieved 7 April 2020.
  61. Zhong, Raymond; Krolik, Aaron; Mozur, Paul; Bergman, Ronen; Wong, Edward (8 June 2020). "Behind China's Twitter Campaign, a Murky Supporting Chorus". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Archived from the original on 2 January 2021. Retrieved 9 June 2020.
  62. Langley, William; White, Edward (14 March 2022). "China backs Russian allegations about US biological weapons". Financial Times. Archived from the original on 10 December 2022. Retrieved 25 March 2022.
  63. McCarthy, Simone (10 March 2022). "China's promotion of Russian disinformation indicates where its loyalties lie". CNN. Retrieved 24 March 2022.
  64. Goodwin, Bill (23 March 2022). "Chinese state media use Facebook to push pro-Russia disinformation on Ukraine war". Computer Weekly. Retrieved 24 March 2022.
  65. Young, Oliver (11 March 2022). "Chinese State Media Reinforces Russian Disinformation About War in Ukraine". China Digital Times. Retrieved 24 March 2022.
  66. "China says it has wrapped up war games around Taiwan, as Taipei hits out at fake news". Radio Free Asia. 11 August 2022. Retrieved 11 August 2022.
  67. Everington, Keoni (10 August 2022). "Photo from Chinese warship off Taiwan coast deemed fake". Taiwan News. Retrieved 11 August 2022.
  68. Yu, Matt; Lin, Ko (6 August 2022). "20 Chinese warplanes, 14 warships deployed around Taiwan: MND". Central News Agency. Retrieved 6 August 2022.
This article is issued from Wikipedia. The text is licensed under Creative Commons - Attribution - Sharealike. Additional terms may apply for the media files.